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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THOMAS DUANE DANKS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

JOHN "\V. TURNER, WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

Case No.
12874

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Thomas Duane Danks, appeals
from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court
denying his release from the Utah State Prison upon
a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On January 3, 1972, Thomas Duane Danks filed
a Complaint and Petition seeking a 'Vrit of Habeas
Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, alleging that his commitment to the Utah State
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Prison was invalid. The matter came on for hearing on
l\Iarch U, rn72, before Judge Joseph G. Jeppson, who
denied the petition on April 4, 1972.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Thomas Duane Danks, seeks a reversal of the judgment of the court below with the direction that he be released from the custody of the Respondent upon a writ of habeas corpus.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Thomas Duane Danks was arrested for robbery in
October of 1970. On November 9, 1970, he requested
a ninety-day disposition pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 77-65-1, ( 195:3). ( R. 3) The information
charging robbery was filed December 18, 1970 (R. 3)
and a trial date was set for February 2, 1971. On that
date, which was within the ninety day period since the
request for disposition, the prosecutor was not prepared. to proceed with the trial because the secretary in
his office had forgotten to send out the subpoenas. (Exhibit 2, p. 46-48) Appellant's trial counsel offered to
proceed on February 4, 1971, still within the ninety day
period, but that date was not agreed upon. The trial
date was set for February 8, 1971, a Monday, which
was the ninety-first day since the request for disposi-

a
tion. (Exhibit 2) Appellant objected to proceeding on
that date because the court had no jurisdiction over the
case because the trial had not been held within the ninety
day period as provided in Utah Code Annotated, § 7765-1 and 2, ( 1953). (Exhibit 2)
On October 13, 1970, Officer I<'loyd Ledford obtained a search warrant to search the Colonial Village
l\fotel for molley and money bags taken in the robbery.
In support of the search warrant, Officer Ledford filed
a supporting affidavit which provided: (Exhibit 1)
On the date of October 13, 1970, at approxinuttely 11 :00 a.m., your affiant received information from the victim of a robbery that
occurred October 13, in which Thomas Danks
was arrested and searched by Officer Hardwick. Items used in the crime were found, and
reason to believe that further items taken in
the crime are at the residence of Thomas
Danks at the Colonial :Motel at aforementioned
address.
Based on this affidavit a search warrant was issued
( R. 5) and the items described in the warrant were
seized from the Colonial .l\Iotel (R. 35) and introduced
at trial over appellant's objection. (R. 35} A motion
to suppress the items seized was held prior to trial and
the motion was denied. ( R. 24)
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ARGlJ:MENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOYV ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A 'VIUT OF '
lIAilEAS CORPUS BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT IL\VE THE .JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE.

It is abundantly clear that a conviction and judg-

ment can be collaterally all<tcked on the lmsis that the '
trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter. See, e.g.
Sulli'l. an v. 'l'urner, 22 Utah2d 85, 448 P.2<1907 (1968);
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 068 ( 1!)68);
Bryant v. Turner, 10 Utah 2d 284, 431P.2d121 (19G7).
1

Appellant contends that his cmwiction and the
ju<lgment thereon must be set aside because the Third
Judicial District Court was without jurisdiction because he ,\·as not brought to trial within ninety days
after he filed a nintty day notice of disposition. Utah
Code Annotated, § 77-65-1, ( 1053) proYides:
'VheneYer a person has entered upon a term
of imprisonment in a penal or con ectional institution of this state, and whenever during the
continuance of the term of imprisonment there
is pending in this state any untried indictment,
information, or complaint against the prisoner,
he shall be brought to trial within ninety days
after he shall caused to be delivered to the
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County Attorney of the county in which the
indictment, information or complaint is pending and the appropriate court written notice
of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information, or complaint; proviue<l, that for good cause shown in open court,
the prisoner or his counsel being present, the
court having jurisdiction of the matter may
grant any necessary or reasonable continuance
... (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-65-2, ( 1953), then provides:
In the event that the action is not brought to
trial within the period of time as herein provided, no court of this state shall any longer
have jurisdiction thereon, nor shall the untried
indictment, information, or complaint be of any
further force or effect, and the court shall
enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.
This court has dealt with these statutes in recent
cases. In State v. Belcher, 25 Utah2d 37, 475 P.2d
60 ( 1970)' the prisoner filed ninety day disposition
before the information was filed. The complaint was
.ii1_•:i c,11 ,\
ti, l!HHl. The notice for the ninety day
disposition ":as filed on September 19, 1969, and the in! ,i1·tiicr: :01 \
Lie<l .i.\'"ovember
1969. The trial was

a
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set for December 8, 1969, on which date a notice of
insanity was filed. The State got a continuance for good
cause shown. The matter was then set for January 26,
1970, and the prisoner was not there. On nlarch 9, 1970,
the prisoner pleaded guilty to a lesser felony. This court,
through .Justice Ellett, said that there was no way to
dispose of the matter until the information was filed,
as a guilty plea to a f elouy must be entered to an information and not a complaint. 'This court said the request for ninety day disposition was premature. This
court, after the Belcher case, dealt with the problem in
State v. Bon11!J, 25 Utah2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970).
In that case the prisoner filed the noti('e for ninety day
diposition two days after the complaint was filed. The
trial setting was later offered; the date offered being
within the ninety day period. The trial was then set to
a date which was five days beyond the ninety day period.
The court said that if there is a reasonable basis in the
record to support the proposition that the trial court
oTanted a continuance "for rroocl cause shown" it is
b
within his discretion and authority to do so. Justice
Ellett concurred in a separate opinion as follows:
C'

The defendant prematurely demanded final
disposition of the case before the information
was filed. He was tried within the ninety days
following the filing of the information. 25
Utah2d at 119.
This separate opinion clearly indicates that the majority
of this court did not find that the fact that the notice
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was filed prior to the filing of the information was fatal
to the prisoner's contention. That is, Justice Ellett's
opinion said that the notice was premature. The majority of the court did not so hold, hut decided the case on
the basis that "good cause" within the meaning of the
statute was shown. This opinion in Bonny clearly repudiates the Belcher opinion of this court, decided prim·
to Bonny, that the notice must be filed after the information is filed. Further support for the proposition that
the ninety day notice can be filed prior to the filing of
the information is found in the language of the statute
itself, Utah Code Anotated, § 77-65-1, ( 1953). The
statute provides that the notice can be filed to an indictment, information, or complaint, and that the notice
is to be filed in the appropriate court. Thus, in the case
of a complaint, the "appropriate court" is different
than if the notice is for final disposition of an information. Because the purpose of the statute is to carry into
effect the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial
ancl define precisely what is meant by a "speedy trial"
[See
v. TVilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453, P.2d 158
( 1969) ] , the notice and request for such a trial within
the ninety day period can clearly be meaningful only
if the request can be invoked at the early stages of the
criminal prosecution. Otherwise, a request for a ninetyday disposition (speedy trial) would mean little if the
criminal process -took an excessive time from the period
when the complaint is filed until the time the information was filed. For Utah Code Annotated, § 77-65-1,
( 1953), to be meaningful, it is clear that the notice and
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request must be considered valid if it is filed before the
information is filed. Further in State v. JVilson, supra,
this court held the trial court had no jurisdiction because the trial was not within the ninety day period, and
the charge was dismissed. There the notice was filed before the information was filed. N othina in Belcher or
Bonny indicates that JVilson has been overruled. Further, the stipulation by the State indicates no objection
to the way the notice was filed. The State did not object
in the lower court that the notice was filed prematurely. Therefore, the general rule prevails that unless ohjected to at trial, a point cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. Thus appellant contends that any defect
or error in the way the notice was filecl was waived by
the state.
i:-,

The ninetieth day in appellant's case fell on a Sunday. Rule 6 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that if the last day of a period of time prescribed
by an applicable statute is a Sunday, the period is extended to the next day. I-Iowever, appellant did not object to the fact that the trial \vas not held on the ninetieth
day. The objection was to the fact that the trial was not
held within the ninety day period when appellant was
prepared to proceed and when appellant offered to
proceed.
The record (R. 3) clearly indicates that the trial
was held on the ninety-first day after the notice for
ninety day disposition was filed. The trial was held on
February 8, 1971. It was originally set for February
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2, 1971, but it was continued beyond the ninety day
period because the secretary at the District Attorney's
Office forgot to send out the subpoenas in time. Appell:mt offered to go to trial on February 4, 1971, within the ninety days, and objected to the February 8, 1971,
date. Appellant contends that the fact that the District
Attorney's secretary forgot to send out the subpoenas
is not "good cause shown" within the meaning of the
statute.
'Vhile it is true that a court can continue a criminal matter in its wise discretion, the dictates of Utah
Co<le Annotated, § 77-65-1, ( 1953), mandate that a
continuance be only for "good cause." The burden of
complying with the statute is on the prosecution. State v.
1Vilson, supra. "Good cause shown" is not a fixed term,
and is a matter for judicial determination in each
particular case. See, e.g. Fif,.e v. State, 388 P.2d 397
(Oki. 1963). However, it is equally clear that "good
cause shown" means a substantial reason, a legal excuse.
In Norton v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 65, 411 P.2d
170 ( 1966), the court dealt with a statute that provided
that trial must be had within a certain time after arraignment. The statute provided that the trial could be
continued for "good cause shown." In that case the
prosecutor offered as reasons for getting a continuance
that he had six past due cases and that the courts were
congested. The court held that the burden of showing
good cause was on the prosecution and that a defendant's
statutory and constitutional rights were not dependent
on the amount of business cow·ts have, or good cause
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for delay would depend on the popufolion of the county in which the defendant was prosecuted. A ppe1lant
contends that his statutory and constitutional right
should not be dependent on the effieicncy of the District Attorney's secretary. "Good cause" will he totally
meaningless if a trial can be continued because a secre·
tary forgot to <lo something. If a secretary's failure to
send out subpoenas is "good cause shown," Utah Code
Annotated, § 77-65-1, ( Hl53) , is not mandatory as its
language indicates. It would not even be directive if
one couhl simply say something was "forgotton" and
so a continuance was needed.
Appellant contends that the
has not
shown good cause for not having the trial within the
niuety day period after the notice and request for disposition was properly filed. Therefore, under the dictates of Utah Code Annotated, § 77-65-1 and § 77-65-2,
( 1953) the trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter and the information should have been dismissed. Appellant contends that as the trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter, the conviction and judgment are
invalid and must be set aside.

POINT II
THE COURT
ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A vVRIT OF'
HABEAS CORPUS U E C A U S E ITEMS
ILLEGALLY SEIZED UNDER AN INVALID
SEAHCI-I '¥ARRANT
INTRODUCED
AGAINST APPELLANT AT TRIAL.
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Appellant contends that the judgment of conviction can he attacked collaterally because of extraordinary circumstances. In this case, the requirements
of law were so ignored and distorted that appellant was
deprived of due process. Numerous cases in this court
have held that under such circumstances, a judgment of
conviction can be attacked collaterally. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Tnrncr, supra; Brown v. Turner, supra; Bryant
'!.'. Turner, supra; Gallegos 'l'. Turner, 17 Utah2d 273,
409 P .2d 386 ( 1965). Further, this court in Jaramillo
v. 1'urner, 24, Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 343 (1970), held
that if there is a rniscaniage of justice and it would be
unconscionable not to re-examine a conviction, and an
appeal was not taken for some justifiable reason, the
error can be corrected by collateral attack despite the
normal rules of procedure. Appellant contends that
where there is, as here, a purely constitutional question
as to the validity of a search warrant, that question can
be examined on collateral attack.
Evidence that was seized under the search warrant
was introduced against appellant at his trial. (R. 35)
That eveidence consisted of items taken in a robbery.
( R. 35) A ppcllant contends that the search warrant
was invalid because it was issued pursuant to an affidavit in support of a search warrant, that affidavit not
showing probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
Appellant sought to suppress the evidence at a motion
to suppress hearing. The motion was denied. (R. 35)
Appellant now contends that the introduction of the
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evidenee seized under the search warrant was an error
such that he was denied due process of law.
In Nathanson v. Unaed States, 2!>0 U.S. 41, 54
S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 154' ( H)33), the United States
Supreme Court held that an affirmation of suspicion or
belief in the application for a search warrant, without
any statement of supporting facts, will not meet the
probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
In Nathanson a search warrant was issued upon the allegation that the affiant had "cause to suspect nnd docs
believe" that certain merchandise was in a spef'ified location. The Court said that the affidavit "went upon mere
affirmation of suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate supporting facts." The Court then
held:
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may
not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause
therefore from the facts arnl circumstances presented to him under oath or afi frmation. Mere
affirmation of belief or suspicion is not
enough.
Appellant contends that lhe affidavit in support of the
search warrant was just as defective as that in Nathan·
so11. There were no underlying facts and circumstances
set forth to support the belief stated.
The Court later in Aguilar v. Tc.ras_. 378 U.S. 108,
84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 ( 1964), further set
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forth the probable cause standards that must be met.
In that case the affidavit in support of the search warrant stated as follows:
Affiants have received reliable information
from a credible person and do believe that
heroin ... [and other drugs] are being kept at
the above described premises . . . [contrary to
law].
On that basis a search warrant was issued. The Comt
first held that the standard of reasonableness for a
search was the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83
S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (l!J63). The Court then
explained that
The informed and deliberate determinations of
the magistrate, empowered to issue warrants
... are to be preferred over the hurried actions
of officers ... who may happen to make arrests ... 12 L.Ed.2d at 736
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is
not often grasped by zealous officers, is not that
it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that these inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
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competitive cnterpris2 of f erretti11g out crime.
Jones v. U nitcd States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct.
725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 ( 1960)
The Court indicated that while substantial deference
must he paid to a magistrate's determination of probable
cause, the courts must still insist on a nentral and detached function and that magistrates not serve "merely
as a rubber stamp for police." The Court then held, 12
L.Ed.2d at 727, that the magistrate must judge for
himself the persuasin:ness of the f aets relied on by a
complaining officer to show probable cause. Ile should
not accept without question the complainant's mere conclusions.
The affidavit in support of a search warrant need
not reflect only the personal observations of the affiant
if the magistrate is informed of underlying circumstanceis supporting affiant's conclusions and belief. The
Court in United States v. V cntresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85
S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2<1 H84 (1!:>65) upheld the search
warrant and found prohah1e cause, and reaffirmed the
above principles and said, 13 L.Ed.2d at 689:
This is not to say that probable caUS(' can be
made out by affi<lavits which are purely condusmy, stating only the affiant's or au informer's belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of the 'underlying circumstances' u Lt)Ofi which the belief is based.
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Petitioner contends that the affidavit in this case was
stated in conclusory terms. The statement that "items
used in the crime were found" is clearly a conclusion
totally unsupported by any underlying facts or circumstances which explained to the magistrate how the affiant knew it to be true.
The Court in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 89 S.Ct. 58·t. 21 L.Ed.2d G37 (1969) dealt with
the following situation. The affidavit in support of the
search warrant stated that the F .B.I. had watched the
defendant's activities for several days, the activities
were described, information as to the defendant's telephone listing was set forth, a statement was made by
the affomt that the defendant was known to affiant
as a bookmaker. The Court said, concerning the statement of affiant that the defendant was known to him
as a bookmaker, that it was but a "bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight
in appraising the magistrate's decision." The Court then
dealt wth the problem of the corrobroation of the informer's tip and the sufficiency thereof. The Court
said, 21 L.Ed.2d at 645, that suspicion can't be used
"to give additional weight to allegations that would
otherwise be insufficient."
From the above cases it is apparent that the affidavit in support of the search warrant in appellant's
case was defective in that it did not state probable
cause. It is of no consequence that there may have been
additional information available to the police or magistrate.

lG
It is elementary that in passing on the validity
of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider
only information brought to the magistrate's
attention. Aguilar v. Texas, supra,' fn. 1, 12
L.Sd.2d at 728.
See also Spinelli v. United States, fn. 3, 21 L.Ed.2d at
642. Appellant thus contends that the presence or absence of probable cause must Le determined solely on
the basis of what is contained in the supporting affidavit.
Appellant contends that the affidavit in this case
was not sufficient under the above eases. All that is
contained is an affirmation of belief that items taken
were at appellant's residence. That was condemned by
Nathanson, supra, and the cases following. The affidavit contains a conclusion that "items used in the crime
were found." No underlying facts and circumstances
were set forth supporting the conclusion. The affidavit
also states that the affiant received information from
the victim of the crime, but the affidavit does not state
what that information was.
Thus, appellant contends that the affidavit did not
show probable cause, and so the warrant was invalid.
As a result, the items were seized invalidly and should
not have been admitted at trial. As they were, appellant
contends that he was denied due process of law and his
conviction is invalid and must be set aside.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the charge and that items illegally seized were introduced at trial, appellant respectfully
submits that the judgment of the court below he reversed and that he be granted the writ of habeas corpus
he seeks.
Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE C. LUBECK
Attorney for Appellant

